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The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act' has now been law for more
than 36 years. The debates over whether a purely declaratory judgment
can be the product of a justiciable "controversy" in the constitutional
sense have long since passed away, set to rest by the language of the Act
itself and by the Supreme Court's decision that the Act was authorized
by the judiciary article of the Constitution. 2 The last edition of Professor
Borchard's great work, Declaratory Judgments,3 was published in 1941,
and the most recent article analyzing the constitutional significance of
the Act was published shortly before Chief Justice Warren took his place
on the Court in October 1953. 4 The present, therefore, is an appropriate
time to review the developments in declaratory litigation since the
beginning of the Warren Court.
Shortly before the momentous October 1953 term, the Supreme
Court gave assurance that the Act was "procedural only" and did not
enlarge jurisdiction otherwise granted.5 Experience under the statute has
demonstrated the error of this statement. The reform was never "only
procedural." In constitutional litigation it combined with other
developments to create causes of action where none had existed before,
and thus changed both the substantive rights of parties and the
jurisdiction of courts. 6 Partly as a result, what constitutes a justiciable
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law, J.D. 1930, Harvard University.
1. "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to federal taxes,
any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment
or decree and shall be reviewable as such." 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
"Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted,
after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by
such judgment." Id. § 2202.
2. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
3. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as BORCHARD].
4. Pugh, The Federal Declaratory Remedy: Justiciability, Jurisdiction and Related
Problems, 6 VAND. L. REv. 79 (1952).
5. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950).
6. In ordinary private litigation, not involving constitutional issues, the Act has usually
served merely to accelerate the granting of relief in cases otherwise ripe for decision. A number of
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"controversy" under Article III of the Constitution, over which federal
courts can or should assert jurisdiction, has never been more unsettled
than it is at the present time. This effect was entirely unforeseen by
Professor Borchard, the author of the Act. In 1941, Borchard inveighed
against "the narrowness of view which grew up around the words
'cases' and 'controversies,' originating in a desire to avoid the decision
of constitutional cases," and urged a comprehensive reexamination of
the "whole question of justiciability. ' 7 He has had his wish, and it may
fairly be said that the problem now is the opposite of the one he
described. Instead of "narrowness" in the definition of "controversy,"
there is an unprecedented breadth. Instead of "a desire to avoid the
decision of constitutional cases," the Supreme Court majority in recent
years has often displayed an unabashed enthusiasm. It seems
appropriate, therefore, to make a further "reexamination" of the
subject in the light of the recent momentous years.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF A "CONTROVERSY"
The courts and writers are generally agreed on the abstract elements
of a constitutional "controversy." Borchard's definition is
representative:
Were the controversy not genuine or ripe for judicial decision, with a plaintiff
and defendant having actually or potentially opposing interests, with a res or other
legal interest definitely affected by the judgment rendered and the judgment a final
determination of the issue, it would fail to present ajusticiable dispute-not because
it seeks a declaratory judgment, but because it lacks the elements essential to invoke
any judgment from judicial courts.8
For present purposes, therefore, the elements of a justiciable
"controversy" may be enumerated as (1) an issue or issues "legal" in
nature, (2) ripe for judicial decision, (3) on which adverse positions are
represented by interested parties, and (4) susceptible of a judgment
finally disposing of the issues. These abstract elements must be clothed
in flesh by discussion of specific cases before any conclusions can be
drawn about the present condition of the law in constitutional
declaratory judgment cases. A few preliminary observations, however,
remain to be stated.
The first is that no analysis is possible unless the Supreme Court's
decision of a controversy is distinguished from the opinion justifying or
Supreme Court cases during the period 1953-70 fall into this category. These cases, plus others that
are cumulative or of limited interest to the questions at hand, are collected, for reference purposes, in
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explaining that decision. Repetition here of the old law school dichotomy
between "decision" and "dictum" would not be justified except for the
fact that it recently has been widely misunderstood. An opinion should
determine the rights of the parties, relate that determination to previous
cases, and serve as a precedent for similar cases. Only the determination
of the rights of the parties represents the decision, and only that portion
can be examined to decide whether the court had a true "controversy"
before it. If no rights are determined, the opinion is necessarily
"advisory."' It has been plausibly argued that the Supreme Court
should be given the power by constitutional amendment to render
advisory opinions, 0 but until recently no one had argued that the Court
already possessed the power to strike down a statute without regard to its
impact in a particular case. This argument has now been made. The
alleged existence of this power is defended on the ground that it is a
"principled response" to the "failure of other methods of adjudication
to protect first amendment rights adequately."" It is further argued that
to deny the power would be "anomalous" because the Court can grant a
declaratory judgment on a "contemplated course of conduct."'
12
So confused a conception of what courts do, and are authorized to
do, would hardly have seen the light of day at the beginning of the period
here under review. Certainly it finds no support among the original
advocates of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Borchard, the father of the
Act, was clear on this point. "Generally speaking, the ultimate goal of
civil procedure is the judgment, to which all other procedural devices are
preliminary and ancillary."' 3 In Borchard's view, therefore, the final test
of the existence of a controversy is whether the proceeding ends with a
judgment. But what is a "judgment"? Judgments dealing with
substantive law "perform one of two functions-(a) they either establish
the existence of a pre-existing fact or legal relation, or (b) they declare a
new one."" Obviously, a "judgment" under this definition must arise
out of a particular factual situation, involving legal relationships
between ascertainable persons or institutions, and must either confirm or
alter those relationships. If "judgment" now means something else, then
the Declaratory Judgment Act has indeed worked a profound change in
the "controversy" concept and has greatly expanded federal
9. BORCHARD 35.
10. Albertsworth, Advisory Functions in Federal Supreme Court, 23 GEo. L.J. 643 (1935).
II. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. Rnv. 844, 846 (1970).
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jurisdiction. It has been argued that the Act has had exactly this effect.'5
The argument is rested on Thornhill v. Alabama,6 which declared an
antipicketing statute unconstitutional "on its face." The argument,
however, is misplaced; the actual judgment in Thornhill reversed the
defendant's conviction for the specific picketing in controversy. 7 The
fact that in its opinion the Supreme Court chose to rest the reversal on
the invalidity of the statute on its face does not alter the conclusion that
the Court would have lacked jurisdiction to review the decision below
without the specific controversy to be resolved.
The essential elements of a judgment are the same, whether it be
coercive or declaratory. The absence of coercive words indicates "not
the disappearance, but the perfection of the rule of force.'",, The
necessary implication of these words is that the power to coerce must be
standing in the wings, ready to come on stage if needed. The Act itself
gives the power to grant "[flurther necessary or proper relief based on a
declaratory judgment or decree."' 9 The authorization to grant a
declaration of rights "whether or not further relief is or could be
sought" 20 cannot and does not mean that a court may grant a
declaration when the parties are free to disobey it with impunity. The
power to declare rests ultimately on the power to do more than declare,
otherwise no "controversy" exists. 21
The enforceability requirement reflects the close affinity between
declaratory judgments and injunctions. This affinity was recognized in
the first Supreme Court case to hold that a state court's declaratory
judgment presented a justiciable federal controversy.22 The opinion
pointed out that an action for injunction would have lain, and that the
only difference was the absence of allegations of irreparable injury and a
prayer for coercive relief. 23 Prior to the adoption of the Act, the
traditional requirement of a showing of irreparable injury before
granting an injunction was often "lightly regarded" in order to permit
15. Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 55 KY. L.J. 150
(1966); cf. Bernard, Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the United States Supreme Court:
Liberties of the First Amendment, 50 MICH. L. REv. 261 (1951).
16. 310 U.S. 88 (1940), discussed in Bernard, supra note 15, at 273.
17. See Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 533, 539-40 (1951).
18. Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights, The Declaratory Judgment, 16
MICH. L. REv. 69,70 (1917).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1964).
20. Id. § 2201.
21. See Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments, 1941-1949, 62 HARV. L. Rev.
787, 788 (1949).
22. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
23. Id. at 262-63.
[Vol. 24
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the courts to declare the legal effect of specific facts or conduct.24 After
the Act, one might have expected that declaratory actions would have
replaced injunctive actions in such cases. To some extent this change has
occurred, but it is still difficult to see any clear pattern of distinction in
the facts or the law presented by the cases, whether the prayer be for
declaration alone,2 5 injunction alone, 26 or both declaration and
injunction. 27 The observation of Professor Kenneth Davis that
irreparable injury and justiciable controversy are "theoretically
distinct" but "in the context of review of administrative action. . . tend
to become equivalents '2 8 is equally applicable to the decision of
constitutional cases. Plaintiffs may be expected to continue seeking both
declaratory and injunctive remedies in the same action, especially since it
was recently determined that the right to a three-judge court and direct
appeal to the Supreme Court from district court decisions is available in
injunction cases, but not in cases where declaratory judgment alone is
sought, 29 although, as Justice Douglas protested, the effect of the
remedies may be "precisely the same.130 The following discussion of
declaratory judgments, therefore, must take into account the more
important cases in which the prayer is for injunction alone, but the
remedy sought would have the effect of a declaratory judgment.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, Supreme Court
declaratory judgment cases and related injunction cases during the
period 1953 to 1970 will be examined under each of the four elements of
justiciable "controversy" mentioned above.
A. The Legal Nature of the Issues
"To be adjudicated by a federal constitutional court, a dispute must
be of a 'legal' nature." 31 The author of that statement, made in 1952,
24. BORCHARD 8. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by
Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L.J. 445,462 (1943).
25. See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Rabinowitz v. Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605
(1964).
26. See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Railway Employees' Dep't, AFL
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
27. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440
(1964); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
28. 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 23.05, at 310 (1958).
29. Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970) (direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
district court declaratory judgment is not available under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964)). See Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
30. 398 U.S. at 432 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
3 1. Pugh, supra note 4, at 85.
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could also say that although the formulation of an abstract definition of
"legal" is an arduous task, the characterization of a particular dispute
"is not normally difficult. ' 32 As an example of a controversy entirely
"political in nature," the author cited Colegrove v. Green,3 the 1946
case in which the Court held that it had no jurisdiction over
congressional redistricting. So fast has the constitutional world turned
that this illustration can today provoke only a sigh for a simpler bygone
age.
If the nature of a legal question can no longer be defined with
confidence, the consequences of a decision that a question is legal or
nonlegal can perhaps still be stated. "When a court finds that an issue
presented to it is political, it is in fact declaring that someone other than
itself must make the ultimate determination of that issue." Conversely,
when a court finds that an issue is legal, it is declaring that it will make
the ultimate determination. Legislative or executive activities may be
self-initiated; the judiciary acts only on the petition of parties who have
standing to invoke its aid. The legislative and executive branches may
exercise their discretion on the basis of a great variety of facts and
influences, political and otherwise, many of which are not or cannot be
articulated; the judiciary, on the other hand, must base its action on the
record provided by the parties and must justify to the parties the
conclusions it draws from that record. Legislative and executive action is
often not final, but is subject to revision in the light of new experience;
the judgment of a court in a constitutional case is theoretically
immutable. These fundamentally different consequences are reflected in
the judicial requirements of standing, ripeness, and finality and the
corresponding lack of similar requirements in the legislative and
executive fields.
The judicial necessity that the rights of specified parties be finally
determined from an exclusive record imperatively requires reduction and
simplification of the issues. It would be utterly impractical for a court to
consider the multitude of policies, facts, and contentions that a
legislative committee or administrative agency would take into account
as a matter of course. It is submitted that the Court's recognition of
these limitations has been the major factor in its traditional reluctance to
reach constitutional questions. During the period under review, the
Court has continued to profess this same reluctance. For example, in a
declaratory action seeking to invalidate on its face a state statute
32. Id. at 86.
33. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
34. 6A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.14, at 3079 (2d ed. 1966).
[Vol. 24
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subjecting the plaintiff's business to detailed restrictions, Justice
Douglas, speaking for the court, asserted that "the day is gone when the
Court uses Due Process to strike down state business regulations because
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought. '" Similarly, in another case the Court declared that
the imposition of its social and economic philosophy, as exemplified by a
series of cases decided in the first quarter of this century, 3 "has long
since been discarded.
'37
Some of the issues in a case may be legal, even if the others are
"nonlegal." If the legal issues are separable, the Court has the power to
determine them and will often do so.3 On the other hand, the court still
assumes on occasion its traditional arbitrary power to render an entire
case nonlegal by invoking the sovereign immunity doctrine.3 ' Moreover,
the absolute power to deny certiorari has been repeatedly used in cases
contesting the legality of the Vietnam war to avoid deciding even the
question of justiciability."
During the period under review, the Court has faced three major
problems formerly within the "political" area, and it has often utilized
the declaratory judgment in an attempt to impose judicial control. The
problems are those arising from protection of minority voting rights,
legislative redistricting, and desegregation of public schools. Some
lessons may be drawn from these experiences about the practical limits
on converting legislative and executive issues into legal ones.
1. Legal Issues in Voting Rights Cases.-In protecting the
franchise of black citizens, the Court started this period with the basic
decisions already on the record and the remaining problems primarily
those of implementation. A unanimous Court invalidated without
difficulty the discriminatory gerrymandering of a Southern city,4' but it
was another story when the Virginia poll tax was successfully attacked
on the ground that the legislature lacked the power to impose any
35. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,488 (1955).
36. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
37. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). In a recent dissenting opinion Justice
Black used this quotation in a case in which the majority upheld a claim of the constitutional right
to wear black armbands to school as a protest against United States involvement in Vietnam.
Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 519 (1969).
38. Mrvica v. Esperdy, 376 U.S. 560 (1964); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 473 (1959);
Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193 (1958); Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
39. Rabinowitz v. Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963);
City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
40. Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
41. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
1971]
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property tax qualification on the right to vote, whether or not the tax was
discriminatory in the racial sense.42 The majority's disregard for
legislative discretion provoked violent dissent that questioned both the
wisdom and the constitutionality of the Court's invasion into the field of
political questions.
4 3
The decisive developments in this field, however, were produced by
Congress rather than the Court. The Voting Rights Act of 1870 was
amended to allow the Attorney General to bring suit in the name of the
United States against a state.4 4 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 4 set up
elaborate machinery to prevent the discriminatory use of any
registration or voting "test or device." In 1966, a request for a
declaration of its unconstitutionality was denied. 4 The Act provides that
once a state or political subdivision is administratively brought within its
coverage, the use of voting tests is suspended until the political unit
proves them non-discriminatory in federal district court. The
manageable judicial task of making a finding on this issue was
performed in Gaston County v. United States,'4 in which the Court
declared that the appellant had failed to meet the statutory burden of
proof. Thus, under "political" control, a substantial measure of success
was achieved with a comparatively small amount of litigation.
2. Legal Issues and Legislative Redistricting. -The
reapportionment cases exhibit a different line of development. In 1953,
the redistricting of malapportioned legislatures appeared to present no
justiciable "legal" issue. The Supreme Court of the United States had
earlier flatly declared, through Justice Frankfurter, that the judicial
branch "ought not to enter this political thicket."' 48 The Supreme Court
of Tennessee explained its refusal to grant even a declaratory judgment
on legislative redistricting by asserting that to do so would put the court
on the horns of a dilemma: either to stand idly by while the legislature
ignored the decision, or to declare the legislature illegally constituted and
42. Harper v. Virginia Rd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
43. Id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "It was not too long ago that Mr. Justice Holmes felt
impelled to remind the Court that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact the laissez-faire theory of society, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76. The times have
changed, and perhaps it is appropriate to observe that neither does the Equal Protection Clause of
that Amendment rigidly impose upon America an ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism." Id. at
686.
44. This amendment was upheld in United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-73p (Supp. V, 1970).
46. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
47. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
48. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
[Vol. 24
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thus incapable of enacting any law." Since there was no initiative or
referendum in Tennessee, the impasse appeared to be complete.
However, the controversy was renewed in Baker v. Carr,50 and, on
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court had the power to
issue a judgment declaring the Tennessee districting a denial of equal
protection, but at the same time permitting the legislature thus
unconstitutionally chosen to adopt a valid system of reapportionment. 51
The subsequent history of this problem, during which the Supreme
Court departed from the judicial task of applying the Constitution to
invalidate existing districts, and assumed the political task of legislating
new districts, will be examined later. 52 It will suffice to say at this point
that the declaration of rights in Baker v. Carr can reasonably be
characterized as both inevitable and successful, but that the subsequent
mandatory orders establishing districts from the congressional to the
local government level have raised and will continue to raise enormous
difficulties. The essence of these difficulties is the judicialization of a
previously legislative issue through the use of the "one man, one vote"
formula.
3. Legal Issues and Segregation.-The third major advance into
formerly political fields occurred in education. The "separate-but-
equal" doctrine had for 60 years reserved to the federal courts only the
issue of whether in fact "equal" facilities were provided, leaving the
determination of whether such facilities should be "separate" as a
political question. 53 Although this boundary between the legal and
political issues had suffered serious erosion, it was not finally
overthrown until Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.4 The question
left unanswered was where the new boundary would be established. The
Court considered accepting the disposition made in the Delaware case,
one of the four companion cases in the Brown I opinion. There, the state
trial court, upon finding Negro facilities unequal, had simply ordered the
superior white schools to admit the Negro plaintiffs and others similarly
situated.5 5 The Court's judgment, however, rendered a year later in
Brown 1I,59 chose the alternative of recognizing "varied local school
49. Kidd v. MeCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40, appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920
(1956).
50. 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
51. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
52. See text accompanying notes 142-80 infra.
53. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55. Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343, 87 A.2d 862 (Ch.), affd, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 91 A.2d
137 (Sup. Ct. 1952), affd and remanded, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
56. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
1971]
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problems" by directing the trial courts to retain jurisdiction over
desegregation and supervise the local school boards. This fateful
judgment advanced the Court much further into the political field than it
had gone in the voting and redistricting cases. Innumerable questions
originating in the operation of school districts, which had formerly been
considered matters of administrative discretion, were now judicialized.
The subsequent problems, which are yet unresolved, may justly be said
to have arisen from the affirmative assumption of the task of educational
administration rather than from the Court's negative act of prohibiting
separate facilities.
In a situation as fluid as the one now prevailing, dogmatic
statements concerning legal and nonlegal issues would be foolhardy.
Time is needed for consequences to be realized and for perspective to be
gained. It is submitted, however, that the other traditional jurisdictional
safeguards in constitutional controversies-awaiting the "ripeness" of
fact situations before adjudication, accepting controversies only from
persons having "standing," and reaching decisions meeting the
traditional requirements of finality-are by no means obsolete,
especially when the federal courts judicialize controversies over which
they formerly declined jurisdiction. These traditional safeguards will be
considered in the sections that follow.
B. The Ripeness of the Dispute
In order to be a "controversy" within the meaning of Article III of
the Constitution, a dispute must be "ripe," but not overripe or "moot."
The dispute, in other words, must be actual and present, not hypothetical
or dead. The policy values inherent in this requirement go to the very
essence of the place of the federal courts in the constitutional scheme of
things. To accept a constitutional case before the actual rights of the
parties need to be determined is to pose an unnecessary challenge to a
coordinate branch of the federal government or to the government of a
state, thereby endangering acceptance of the judicial role.5 But it is more
than that. It is an abandonment of the fundamental wisdom of English
jurisprudence, which counsels that correct conclusions are most likely to
57. "Marshall, Cooley, Thayer, Hughes and Frankfurter, among others, have reminded the
Court that the crucial power of review and its exercise admit of the utmost delicacy. . . .Another
persuasive factor is that the Court may be less competent than the legislature to decide the
important questions of public policy which are embedded in many constitutional controversies
... .History suggests that if the Court exercises its power of review too readily and too
independently it will be met with rebuke and disdain, with a consequent diminution of influence on
the national scene." Bernard, supra note 15, at 262-63 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 24
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be reached when the judicial mind is focused on the application of legal
principles to specific facts.
The declaratory judgment procedure, which is designed to afford
parties judicial relief at an earlier stage of their dispute, often raises
questions of ripeness in an acute form.- No one realized this better than
Professor Borchard, who prefaced his discussion of ripeness by pointing
out that "the danger or dilemma of the plaintiff must be present, not
contingent on the happening of hypothetical future events . . and the
prejudice to his position must be actual and genuine and not merely
possible or remote." 5' On the other hand, he noted the importance of
recognizing a true controversy:
Perhaps the principal contribution that the declaratoryjudgment has made to
the philosophy of procedure is to make it clear that a controversy as to legal rights is
as fully determinable before as it is after one or the other party has acted on his own
view of his rights and perhaps irretrievably shattered the status quo. Such violence
and destruction make the issue more painful and socially undesirable, but they do
not make it any more controversial."
Obviously, the two statements are in tension, and in fact are not
wholly reconcilable. In the first place, there is a marked difference
between a threat to the plaintiff based on present facts and a threat based
on future facts that the plaintiff has the option to bring into being. The
former is justiciable if the facts are presented in the record; the latter is
arguably within Borchard's definition of a "contingent" danger. In the
second place, the ripeness of a dispute based on future facts over which
the plaintiff has control will frequently depend on whether his further
step will irretrievably shatter the status quo. If the plaintiff has gone as
far as he can without irreparable injury, the fact that the next step is his
to make should not prevent a declaration of what his rights would be if
he takes the fatal step. The court should recognize, however, that such a
declaration is hypothetical and anomalous, and it should confine such
declarations to situations in which the plaintiff has evinced a positive
intention to take the final step, the relevant facts concerning that step are
developed, the threat to the plaintiff if he takes the step is clear, and the
resulting injury cannot be readily repaired. Only by imposing such
limitations can a court avoid the hazards of rendering a declaration that
is merely advisory. No litigant is constitutionally entitled to ask a court
to rule on a series of hypothetical situations until he finally finds one for
which the court's declaration is to his liking. It also should be
58. Racial Integration and Academic Freedom, Part 11, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 899, 930 (1959).
59. BORCHARD 56.
60. Id. at 58.
19711
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reemphasized that if a ripe legal controversy exists, and if a federal court
decides it, the fact that the reasoning in the court's opinion is based on
the invalidity of the statute "on its face" does not provide grounds for
an objection based on justiciability. When deciding whether the Court
was faced with a true "controversy," the touchstone must be the nature
of the Court's determination of the rights of parties, not the reasoning
given for the decision.
Bearing in mind the foregoing observations, the issue of
constitutional ripeness may be brought into focus. Under what, if any,
circumstances should a plaintiff be allowed to obtain a declaration of the
legal consequences of his own future conduct? The Court's position on
this question can be most conveniently examined by dividing the
pertinent cases into three classes: (1) cases in which the danger is to the
plaintiff's status or his ability to continue conduct in which he is already
engaged; (2) cases in which the danger is to new conduct immediately
contemplated and of a specific character; (3) cases in which the danger is
to any new conduct in which the plaintiff may choose to engage, and no
particular contemplated conduct is specified in the record."'
1. Status or Present Conduct. -The first class of cases deals with a
danger to the plaintiff's status, or his ability to continue conduct in
which he is already engaged without subjecting himself to criminal
penalties or other irreparable injury. In these cases, the facts on which
the Court must pronounce judgment are fully developed by the past
conduct. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the period here under review,
the Court occasionally took a narrow view of its jurisdiction in these
situations. In International Longshoremen's Local 37 v. Boyd, 2 for
example, it refused to declare the effect of the immigration laws on the
right of resident alien workmen to re-enter the United States when,
pursuant to established practice, they sought to travel from Seattle to
Alaska for seasonal work. The decision was reached over the objection
of Justice Black, who asserted: "This looks to me like the very kind of
'case or controversy' courts should decide." Similarly, the Court twice
refused to define boundaries between state and federal administrative
regulation of private enterprise." As indicated below, however, the more
usual attitude, both before and after 1953, was to assume jurisdiction
61. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 139
(1953).
62. 347 U.S. 222 (1954).
63. Id. at 224.
64. Public Util. Comm'n v. United Air Lines, Inc., 346 U.S. 402 (1953); Public Serv.
Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
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over declaratory actions seeking to protect existing status or conduct, at
least when the facts were clear and irreparable injury would result from
delay.
In administrative law cases, potential irreparable injury generally
could be established by proof that the continuation of an existing status
or present conduct was threatened and that the plaintiff's remedy before
the agency was either entirely lacking or obviously inadequate. If these
factors could be shown, the Court was justified in intervening before
completion of the agency proceedings. This principle was established
prior to 1953 in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States,"5 in
which the Court reviewed on the merits the validity of a Federal
Communications Commission decision that broadcasting station
licenses would not be renewed if the stations continued to observe
existing contracts with the plaintiff network. Since the contracts in
question were already in force, the facts were specific and concrete. The
plaintiff was suffering irreparable injury because its subscribers were
cancelling their contracts, and the plaintiff was without power to defend
its contracts before the agency because only the individual stations were
licensed. The Court held that this combination of specific facts,
irreparable injury, and lack of administrative remedy produced a
controversy sufficiently "ripe." After 1953, the Court continued to
grant relief under similar circumstances." Conversely, if the facts were
not developed in the record or the plaintiff had an administrative
remedy, the Court often exercised its discretion to deny a declaration,
even though there was likelihood of serious injury to a business or
livelihood.' 7 Two companion cases decided in 1967 are particularly
instructive with regard to the requirements of clear facts, absence of
administrative remedy, and present injury. In one, the Court, applying
the Columbia tests, declared unauthorized a self-executing
administrative regulation that would have invalidated specific drug
labels then in use, thereby causing a substantial and costly change in
65. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
66. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (declaratory judgment
invalidating state commissioner's attempt to censor specified books); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S.
553 (1957) (order compelling Adjustment Board to act on grievances of railroad employees).
Declarations regarding the validity of congressional action depriving the plaintiffs of citizenship
were granted in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), and Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
Declarations on the merits, regarding the personal status of plaintiffs or their right to continue
existing business practices without governmental interference, were frequently granted. See Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
67. E.g., Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New
Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411 (1965); Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474 (1960).
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existing business practices.6 8 In the other, the Court refused to entertain
on the merits an attack on a regulation requiring drug companies to
admit federal inspectors to their premises on demand; no demand had
been made and thus neither specific facts nor present injury were
shown.69
A more troublesome situation is presented when the plaintiff's
existing conduct or status is threatened by criminal prosecution or
agency action, and the only irreparable injury arises from the hardship
or expense of the proceedings themselves. When the threat is to
constitutionally protected personal freedoms, and when it arises from
repeated and harassing police action and prosecutions brought without
reasonable hope of success, the federal court may appropriately
intervene to forbid future harassment. 71 On the other hand, a declaration
or injunction seems unwarranted when it prohibits action by a state
court or federal administrative agency that is apparently proceeding in
good faith and has power to grant relief to the plaintiff. Such
injunctions, nevertheless, have been approved by the Supreme Court in
recent years.
71
In summary, when an existing status or course of action is
disturbed, the Court usually has been willing to declare rights and grant
protection upon proof of irreparable injury, even though its action
prevents another court or agency from proceeding. The cases do not
ordinarily present a constitutional problem, but they raise the question
of whether under the facts it is sound judicial policy to restrain action by
a tribunal with apparent jurisdiction to grant relief. In all of the cases of
this character, ripeness in the constitutional sense seems clearly to have
been present.
2. Specific Future Conduct.-In the second class of cases, the
plaintiff typically has not previously engaged in the contemplated
conduct, but desires to do so, and asks for a judicial declaration that he
is entitled to freedom from governmental interference. Obviously, this
situation is "doubly contingent." Will the plaintiff actually take the
68. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); accord, Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n,
387 U.S. 158 (1967).
69. Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
70. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organ., 307
U.S. 496 (1939). Injunctions in such cases are subject to the limitations of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84
(1964).
71. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); cf. Lewis
v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) (issue identical to the King case but at a later stage in the
administrative process); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960) (subpoenas attacked by
declaratory action were subject to same defenses on petitions to enforce).
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proposed action, and, if he does, will the defendant interfere with him?
The traditional approach has been that no controversy is present unless
the plaintiff proves both his intent to bring about the necessary
occurrence and an official threat of resultant governmental action. 72
Borchard argued that an actual threat should be unnecessary as long as a
statute or regulation apparently proscribes the contemplated action.7
Recent cases seem to have accepted this view, 74 subject to the
qualification that the federal court should abstain until any necessary
clarification of an applicable state statute has been obtained from the
state courts.
75
3. Nonspecific Future Conduct.-In the third class of cases, a
statute or regulation has been attacked on the ground that it is
unconstitutional, not as applied to the plaintiff's specific present or
future conduct, but as it may be applied to any future conduct of the
plaintiff or others similarly situated. The contention is that the statute or
regulation is invalid "on its face" with reference to all possible conduct
conceivably subject to it. Such a contention raises not only the question
of ripeness, but it also raises questions of the standing of the plaintiff to
represent the rights of others 7 and the finality and scope of a judgment
purporting to determine the legal effect of future activities of persons not
before the court.77
Even as to the plaintiff himself, the situation in these cases is
"trebly contingent." Will the plaintiff take any action? If he does, what
specific action will he take? If he does act, will the defendant interfere
with him? Obviously, a declaration under these circumstances presents
in acute form the danger that the rights of parties before the court will be
prejudiced by an ill-considered declaration, not dispositive of any
particular set of facts. There also is the danger that the rights of
nonparties will be prejudiced by "the real or supposed precedential
effects of abstract determinations. ' 78
Prior to the period under review, the Court's answer to plaintiffs
seeking to invalidate statutes on the basis of unspecified future action
72. For a discussion of these requirements see Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at
849, 870. For a discussion of the necessity of official threat see BORCHARD 465-75.
73. Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L.J. 445,
464-75 (1943).
74. E.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964);
Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
75. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 373 U.S. 411 (1964); Government
& Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
76. See text accompanying notes 104-41 infra.
77. See text accompanying notes 142-79 infra.
78. Racial Integration and Academic Freedom, supra note 58.
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was usually decisively negative. Thus, in Alabama State Federation of
Labor v. McAdory, 7" Chief Justice Stone emphasized that the
requirements for a justiciable case or controversy "are no less strict in a
declaratory judgment proceeding than in any other type of suit,"" and
that "all contingencies of attempted enforcement cannot be envisioned
in advance." 81 In 1952, the Court departed from this salutary rule, and
the consequences of its departure are instructive. In Adler v. Board of
Education,8 2 the Court sustained, prior to its specific application to the
plaintiffs, a New York statute requiring public school teachers to
execute a non-Communist oath. The decision was overruled only fifteen
years later8 because experience with the implications of the decision
exposed its inadequacies. In the earlier case of Thornhill v. Alabama,
on the other hand, the decision protected specific conduct for which the
defendant had been criminally convicted, although the opinion took a far
wider range and invalidated the antipicketing statute on its face. Because
the dispute was sufficiently "ripe," the holding of the case is still valid in
spite of the fact that the Court has limited severely its "broad
pronouncements."
The period here under review opened conventionally with a 1954
"property rights" controversy in which the Court affirmed the refusal of
a state court to invalidate on its face a city excise tax alleged to be
unconstitutionally discriminatory. The Court observed that the
anticipatory character of the suit precluded consideration of the actual
application of the tax or the regulations adopted to implement it.18 Quite
a different approach, however, was soon taken in "personal rights"
cases.8 7 In 1959, the Court considered and sustained on its face a state
literacy test for voters, although the plaintiff had not exhausted her
administrative remedies and had not shown that the test resulted in her
own disqualification. 8 The plaintiff thus obtained a judgment that did
not dispose of her case, since it expressly left open the validity of the test
in actual application.89 This departure from the traditional criteria of an
79. 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
80. Id. at 461.
81. Id. at 462.
82. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
83. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
84. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
85. Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957).
86. Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
87. See Note, supra note 11; Note, supra note 12. See also Bernard, supra note 15 (anticipat-
ing and recommending this approach in first amendment cases).
88. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
89. Id. at 50. The opinion is thus merely advisory, and even its authority as advice is doubtful
in view of the decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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"actual controversy" has since been extended. During the subsequent
years the Court has decided on the merits declaratory and injunctive
actions attacking, in advance of enforcement and without proof of
specific facts, a wide variety of statutes allegedly violative of personal
freedom."
Repeated declarations of the Court have shown that its failure to
require proof of specific facts to establish a "controversy" has not been
inadvertent. In a film censorship case, the Court sustained an ordinance
without consideration of its standards and without knowing the contents
of the film that the plaintiff sought to protect.'1 In a case involving
NAACP solicitation and funding of private civil rights litigation, the
Court stated that a statute proscribing such tactics may be invalid
"whether or not the record discloses that the petitioner has engaged in
privileged conduct."'' 2 Recently, the Court expressly conceded that
whether facts are necessary to establish a justiciable controversy may
depend on which constitutional right is being asserted. In Dandridge v.
Williams,'3 the Court sustained the Maryland welfare law imposing a
maximum limit on assistance to a family because only the fourteenth
amendment was invoked; whereas, it said, if the first amendment were
involved, the regulation might be invalid for "overreaching."
The "chilling effect" doctrine, which has frequently been used in
recent years to "ripen" controversies, deserves examination. The
practice of determining the validity of a statute "on its face" was of
course not unknown prior to 1953, but it typically represented a method
of opinion writing in a case in which the legal effect of specific facts also
had been determined.'4 Only during recent years has the Court
undertaken to make a controversy appear ripe, when it is in fact either
underripe or moot, by the development of the "chilling effect" doctrine
90. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (statute limiting total welfare payments
to a single family); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 623 (1969) (statute limiting
franchise in school board elections to parents of school children and property owners); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (statute establishing a county unit voting system); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963) (legal malpractice statute construed by state court to prohibit the NAACP's
solicitation, funding, and direction of private civil rights litigation). The one recent decision that did
refuse to pass on the merits of a statute penalizing a first amendment right, on the ground that no
threat of prosecution existed, failed to produce a majority decision of the Court. Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497 (1961). That case was later ignored when the Court invalidated an unenforced Arkansas
statute penalizing the teaching of evolution in public schools. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968).
91. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43,44-46 (1961).
92. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963). See also Joseph E. Seagram& Sons, Inc. v.
Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
93. 397 U.S.471 (1970).
94. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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in first amendment cases.95 The doctrine requires that the limitations of
the first amendment be fully read into the fourteenth amendment. It has
been used to hold that the inhibiting effect that a "'vague" or
"overbroad" statute may exert on possible future conduct is itself a
present irreparable injury to freedom of speech or association. Once the
mere existence of the statute is held to constitute a present injury to
constitutional rights, and all such injuries are hypothesized to be
irreparable, it is no longer the duty of the plaintiff to overcome a
presumption of constitutionality." In this event, the government or its
representative has the burden of "justifying" the hypothesized
irreparable injuries to the favored right.9 Since the record in these cases
ordinarily presents no specific facts regarding the application of the
statute, both the plaintiff's asserted right and the state's justification1
8
are based on arguments outside the record and determined by the Court
in accordance with its own social concepts. With the state thus
handicapped, it is not surprising that its hypothetical justifications for
legislation are often found by the Court to be insufficiently weighty to
overcome the hypothetical dangers to the postulated "preferred right."
The "chilling effect" doctrine, as applied in those cases in which no
present or future specific conduct is threatened, is clearly reactionary. It
turns the clock back to the early years of the century, before the days of
the "Brandeis brief," 99 when the Court regularly consulted its own views
of social policy and set aside legislation on the basis of "abstract logic"
without regard to "the logic of facts." 1" It is difficult if not impossible
95. The cases are analyzed in Comment, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. Rav. 844 (1970) and Comment, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 808 (1969).
96. Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
97. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The Court said that "only a compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the state's constitutional power to regulate can justify
limiting First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 438. Accord, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No.
15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
98. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The Court said that the state statute might
be found invalid "whether or not the record discloses that the petitioner has engaged in privileged
conduct." Id. at 432. The Court also found insufficient the state's justifications that it had already
confirmed "petitioner's right to continue its advocacy of civil-rights litigation," and that its right to
regulate the practice of law included the right to prohibit the solicitation and control of other
persons' litigation. Id. at 437-38.
99. The first "Brandeis brief" was filed in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), and its
"very copious collection" of statutory and sociological material convinced the Court that the 10-
hour day for women was justified by their weaknesses and competitive disadvantages. Id. at 419.
Current enlightenment has presumably now demonstrated the fallacies into which Mr. Brandeis and
the Court fell, but should not invalidate their approach to the constitutionality of legislation.
100. For the background of Muller v. Oregon see A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE
248 (1946). The stubborn persistence of the archaic approach is illustrated by Jay Burns Baking Co.
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to square acceptance of such unripe cases with the "controversy"
requirement of the Constitution.
The existence of the Declaratory Judgment Act has undoubtedly
facilitated this retrogressive process. Although the Act was never
intended to permit declarations regarding the validity of statutes unless
the Court also decided the specific rights of particular parties, 10
declarations are in fact issued under it without considering whether they
are, or will ever become, enforceable.0 2 Furthermore, as old criteria of
ripeness are dissolved, the process of determining whether an acceptable
controversy exists may become exhaustingly prolonged. In two recent
"chilling effect" cases, the plaintiffs obtained decisions from the
Supreme Court that their cases were within federal court jurisdiction,
only to have the actions dismissed on a second appeal because they were
not ripe for decision on the merits.0
It is submitted that the Supreme Court can best reassert control
over the decision-making process by a return to traditional standards of
ripeness. The Court should reestablish the principle that district courts
may accept for declaratory judgment only cases presenting a substantial
danger to existing status or conduct, or cases in which the plaintiff has
evinced a positive intention to proceed immediately on a clearly defined
new course of conduct, and the defendant threatens to cause him
irreparable injury if that course of conduct is pursued. No reversal of
substantive law on constitutional rights is necessary in order to pursue
this course. By thus returning to the historic jurisdiction of the federal
courts, the Supreme Court will better serve the rights of parties, avoid
unnecessary confrontations with the states and coordinate branches of
government, and better perform its constitutional and statutory duty to
decide only "actual controversies."
v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting), which invalidated the Nebraska
statute establishing maximum and minimum weights for loaves of bread as "contrary to common
experience and unreasonable."
101. BORCHARD 41-42, 56-58.
102. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
103. Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd and remanded, 389 U.S.
241 (1967), declaratory judgment entered, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd and remanded
sub nom. with directions to dismiss as moot, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 1103 (1969); Cameron v.
Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss. 1964), dismissal vacated and case remanded, 381 U.S. 741
(1965), dismissed on the merits, 262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1966), affd, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
Unfortunately, the American Law Institute has embraced the "chilling effect" doctrine of these and
other cases, and even has extended it by eliminating any specific requirement that prior harassment
or future irreparable injury be proved. See ALl STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1372(7), at 52, 308-12 (1969).
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C. Standing of Plaintiff to Sue
Since "adverse litigants" are essential to the existence of a "case"
or "controversy,"' ' 04 the plaintiff's standing to sue is an issue of
constitutional significance. In recent years, however, the importance of
the standing requirement as a barrier to litigation had been greatly
diminished. Some of the reasons for this development already have been
examined. The expanding definition of "legal dispute" obviously entails
a corresponding extension of the interests protected and the classes of
persons entitled to protect them. The great surge of judicial protection
for the rights of minorities, whether racial or electoral, has contributed
to the development of the declaratory judgment as a class of
representative action in which the parties' interests do not differ
materially from the interests of a large class of nonparties. In addition,
there is an apparent trend to recognize the judicial controversy as a
device for the protection of the public at large-a development that may
cause the desuetude of present limitations on the class action. As
Borchard prophetically stated 30 years ago: "The idea of 'legal interest'
is an expanding conception and rules of practice should not be used as a
bar to its development." '
Constitutional "standing" is, in the absence of statute, for judicial
determination, and injury to a "legal right" was the traditional judicial
test.'0 In recent years, however, any jeopardy to the plaintiff's financial
interest usually has been sufficient to give him standing, whether that
interest be employment, 0 7 sale of allegedly pornographic books,'"
freedom from unlawful competition,'" protection of state funds,"0 or
protection from bondage to the "company store.""' Nonfinancial
104. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346 (1911). On appeal from a state court, plaintiff's standing to sue is a federal question which
the Supreme Court must determine for itself. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522
(1959).
105. BORCHARD 203.
106. In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), the Court
created a "legally protected right" to be "free from defamatory statements" through publication of
the Committee's name on the Attorney General's Communist List. It then held that plaintiffs had
standing to protect this "right" although no "direct demands" were made on them. Id. at 141.
Justice Frankfurter concurred on the ground that the "hardship" to the Committee was sufficient
to give it standing. Id. at 149.
107. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conf., 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
108. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
109. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organs., Inc. v. Camp, 395 U.S. 976 (1970). First
Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966).
110. Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dep't, 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
Ill. Barlow v. Collins, 396 U.S. 925 (1970).
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constitutional interests have received even greater protection. It is no
longer a valid objection to the assertion of first amendment rights that
the plaintiff is in the same position as thousands of others, or that he
fails to show that the statute presently injures him." 2 In fact, the whole
concept of "legal right" is dissolving in this field. The Court recently
declared that deprivation of the opportunity to be a juror gives standing,
even though the plaintiffs did not prove that the deprivation was directed
at them personally; the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether
jury service is "a right, a privilege or a duty."
' 3
As the foregoing cases clearly indicate, the battle for the principle
that a plaintiff who has suffered "injury in fact" has standing is a battle
of the day before yesterday; nevertheless, Professor Kenneth Davis is
fighting it still."' The need now is to remove the debris of that battle,
find where we stand, and prepare for the battles to come. "Injury in
fact" is a most elusive phrase, which seems precise but actually settles
nothing. Ambiguity inheres in each part of it. In the first place, to
determine the meaning of "injury," it must be decided what interests
should receive protection, what persons are entitled to protect them, and
how much of an adverse effect on those persons should constitute
actionable harm. If the interests that deserve protection are
characterized as "legal" interests, which is to say, interests that the
legislature or the courts say shall be protected, the result is mere
tautology. In the second place, what is an injury "in fact?" If by this
phrase is meant an existing injury, the test is erroneous, since threatened
injury has been sufficient at least since the enactment of the Declaratory
Judgment Act. And once it is recognized that a threatened injury is
sufficient, the issue becomes one of ripeness, not standing. As Professor
Davis himself correctly says: "The courts should avoid hypothetical or
remote questions. . . through the law of ripeness, not through the law of
standing."
Examples of genuine interests that were at one time believed legally
unprotected were the so-called "privileges," which arose when the
government had discretion to contract or not to contract, to license or
112. In both Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), and Watson v. City of Memphis,
373 U.S. 526 (1963), plaintiffs were permitted to assert first amendment rights even though their
position was not distinguishable from that of many others. Similarly, in Carter v. Jury Comm'n,
396 U.S. 320 (1970), and Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961), the plaintiffs'
failure to show present injury did not bar the assertion of their constitutional rights.
113. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970).
114. Compare Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 450 (1970), with
3 K. DAvis. supra note 28, § 22.02.
115. Davis, supra note 114, at 469.
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not to license, or to pay or withhold benefits. The legislature or its
delegate claimed the discretionary right to deny or withdraw the license
or benefit, without granting a hearing or giving reasons, on the ground
that the recipient lacked standing to challenge its action. Prior to 1953,
the Supreme Court accepted such claims of absolute discretion.,
Shortly thereafter, however, a new trend became apparent. The Court
held in 1954 that even an alien under order of deportation was entitled to
a hearing before an unbiased tribunal on whether the deportation should
be suspended." 7 By 1958, it was clear that the right to withhold a benefit
no longer included the right to do so unfairly or arbitrarily. In that year
the Court declared that an applicant for a state tax exemption was
denied procedural due process by a requirement that he execute a non-
Communist affidavit, even though it admitted that the limitation of the
benefit to non-Communists was substantively valid."' More recently, the
Court has declared that a state's interest in purging its welfare rolls is
outweighed by the recipient's possible need, and that the plaintiff-
recipient thus has standing to challenge the lack of a "due process
hearing" before the delisting. 1
The new Court has not been content with recognizing the standing of
the applicant for, or holder of, a privilege to obtain procedural due
process. In recent years it also has reviewed the substantive terms on
which many privileges have been granted or withheld. The practice of
law, for example, traditionally has been considered a privilege, but state
regulation of this occupation was severely circumscribed when the Court
granted a declaratory judgment preventing state interference with the
NAACP's control over the civil rights litigation of its members.'2
Similarly, the Court majority recently granted welfare beneficiaries
standing to challenge, on their faces, statutes requiring one-year
residency for receipt of benefits,' 2' regulations allowing greater aid to
children in one county than in another, 22 statutes and regulations
reducing benefits when there is a "man in the house,"' and a statute
establishing a maximum limit for payments to any one family. 21 While
116. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113
(1940).
117. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
118. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
119. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
120. NAACPv. Button, 371 U.S.415 (1963).
121. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
122. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
123. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
124. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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some of these constitutional objections were not sustained on the merits,
the Court made its position on standing clear by expressly disapproving
the argument that welfare benefits are a "privilege" and not a "right,"
and by putting the burden on state officers to show "compelling
necessity" for withdrawal.1 25
Encouraged by the broad definition of standing in the
Administrative Procedure Act, z2 ' the Court also has granted statutory
standing where it had been withheld, prior to that Act, under identical
congressional language. 127 Furthermore, the Court does not now
question the standing of a public official who is given the statutory right
to sue on behalf of a group of citizens, is even though the official has no
interest in the suit beyond enforcement of the law. The rationale of these
cases would appear to be that when a statute creates an interest, and
expressly or impliedly authorizes a citizen or a public official to bring
suit to protect that interest, standing in the constitutional sense exists. 9
Given the present state of the law, therefore, it seems improbable that
Congress or the states could make any personal "privilege" subject to
final administrative discretion, no matter how clear a bounty or gratuity
they might declare it to be.
If a statute establishes an important public interest, but creates no
recognizable protected class narrower than the public at large, and if it
also fails to nominate a public official entitled to sue, will any citizen or
group of citizens have "standing," even though affected no more than
the public generally? A standard treatise on federal jurisdiction still says
that the plaintiff "must assert an adequate interest in himself, which the
law recognizes, against a defendant having a substantial adverse
interest."'3 0 Until 1953, the Court customarily spoke of the need of a
125. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969). The Shapiro case relied on Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), but the Sherbert case involved denial of unemployment benefits to a
Seventh Day Adventist for refusal to work on Saturday, and plaintiff therefore had standing under
the free exercise clause. Justice Harlan protested in vain that this presumption against legislative
action and in favor of judicial control "reflects to an unusual degree the current notion that this
Court possesses a peculiar wisdom all its own whose capacity to lead this nation out of its present
troubles is contained only by the limits of judicial ingenuity." 394 U.S. at 676.
126. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964) provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof."
127. Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48
(1955).
128. Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969); Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 391
U.S. 492 (1968); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
129. But cf Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (plaintiffs were given statutory
standing to sue, but the case was held nonjusticiable for the reason, among others, that defendant
United States "has no interest adverse to the claimants").
130. 6A J. MooRE, supra note 34, 57.15, at 3085 (emphasis added).
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"protected class," narrower than the public at large, and showing
"special injury,"131 but even in those days the Court would review an
ordinary taxpayer's suit arising in a state court.
132
As governmental power has grown, the Court has simultaneously
become more alert to the need for protection of the individual, and the
concept of a citizens' champion has moved increasingly to the fore. The
Court recognized his standing as early as 1958, when it reviewed a class
suit to declare bus segregation invalid. 33 Significantly, the nonresident
Negro plaintiff was not a member of the class of bus-riders who would
traditionally be qualified to sue. A further step was taken in 1962 when
the Court entertained, without discussion of standing, a parents' suit to
compel school authorities to discontinue use of a short voluntary prayer
at the opening of school. The use of the establishment clause, rather than
the free exercise clause, to strike down the prayer seemed to indicate that
plaintiffs' standing did not differ from that of other members of the
public.'3 In 1968, the Court utilized the establishment clause as a source
of standing when a federal taxpayer sought to enjoin the expenditure of
federal funds for religious schools, and thus significantly restricted
previous authority in the area of taxpayers' standing. 35 The 1969 case of
Moore v. Ogilvie3 1 granted standing without discussion to candidates
attacking Illinois elections laws, although the election was past and the
interests asserted were those of nonparties. The rationale, as indicated in
a subsequent case, was simply that someone should have standing,
because the situation was one "capable of repetition, yet evading
review."'' 37 At the same term, the Court granted standing for an attack
on the Louisiana Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry to a
plaintiff who was a union member but had not been personally
summoned or investigated, apparently on the ground that the public
131. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126
(1922).
132. Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1880).
133. Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958). For a criticism of Evers on the ground that
plaintiff did not belong to the protected class see Note, Federal Declaratory Judgment A ct-A ctual
Controversy in Class Actions, 30 Miss. L.J. 329 (1959).
134. "The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, ... is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,430 (1962).
135. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
136. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
137. Moore was distinguished on this ground in Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969), where a
class action to compel registration of voters without satisfying residence requirements was dismissed
as moot after plaintiffs became eligible to register under the statute.
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interest required that the statute be invalidated at the suit of anybody
who was even potentially subject to its operation. 13
In light of the foregoing cases, there is every indication that the
courts will continue to encourage public interest litigation by private
citizens. It is submitted that in an era of expanding government and
mounting public problems, this development is to be welcomed. Federal,
state, and local governments--overwhelmed by numerous and complex
tasks, often inadequately staffed, and usually subject to conflicting
pressures-often cannot or will not prosecute the necessary suits. The
concerned citizen with no special interest to protect is, perhaps, the one
best fitted to serve as plaintiff in such cases. Constitutional
requirements, as well as judicial interest in adequate presentation of the
issues, can be safeguarded by stricter application of the other
requirements of a justiciable "controversy."
The new day has, in fact, already dawned. The Supreme Court
recently expressed its approval of lower federal court cases requiring
administrative agencies to grant standing to representatives of the public
interest in the broadcasting and environmental fields. 39 The issue
undoubtedly will be squarely presented to the Court for decision in the
not too distant future. Recent circuit court cases raise the question,'
and state statutes expressly granting standing to such "private attorneys
general" have recently been enacted.'
D. Finality of the Court's Judgment
In a very real sense, the requirements of a "justiciable controversy"
previously discussed are only preparatory to the ultimate and supreme
requirement that the issues presented to the court be capable of final
disposition by the judicial process. If the controversy is not "legal" in
138. Jenkins v. Mckeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
139. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), citing with
approval, Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966) ("responsible representatives of the listening public" held to have standing before
Commission and court under Communications Act), and Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (organizations representing
public interest held "parties aggrieved" entitled to review under Federal Power Act).
140. E.g., Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970) (club with demonstrated interest
in environment does not have standing to obtain declaration invalidating commercial development
in national forest); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(individual members of public have standing to obtain review of order refusing to ban DDT).
141. See Sax, Environment in the Courtroom, SAT. Rev., Oct. 3, 1970, at 55-57 (discussing
Michigan law authorizing "any person" to maintain action for "declaratory and equitable relief"
to prevent "air, water and other natural resources" from pollution, in addition to existing
administrative and regulatory procedures).
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nature, either because the issues are not susceptible of judicial resolution
or because their resolution has been committed to other authority, the
court's judgment is merely advisory to those having the true power. If
the controversy is not "ripe," because not founded on facts sufficiently
developed or on issues sufficiently formulated, the judgment is subject to
later modification or reversal when the facts and issues are presented
concretely. If the plaintiff has no "standing" to present the controversy
to the court, its judgment is not binding when the issues are later
presented by a plaintiff who does have standing.
The previous discussion, therefore, indicates the dangers to the
court's judgment that result if the elements of a constitutional
"controversy" are not required. Nevertheless, the importance of
"finality" justifies some further discussion directed to this specific
point. The absence of finality is clear enough when the court is asked to
render a money judgment that is subject to revision by a coordinate
branch of the government.12 The problem becomes more difficult when
declaratory judgments are involved. Unlike the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act, the federal Act does not contain language authorizing
refusal of a judgment that "would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceeding."'4 3 Nevertheless, whether the
declaratory judgment would settle the controversy is "a highly
important factor in federal litigation,"' 4 4 and the judgment must be "a
final one, forever binding on the parties on the issues presented. ' " If the
judgment is to be "binding," it follows that coercive relief should be
granted if either party disregards it. Otherwise, the court has rendered
mere "advice." When there is no possibility of present or future coercive
relief, the declaration should be refused.'4
The power of the federal courts to determine a controversy by
declaring state or federal action to be unconstitutional was described in a
1923 case as "little more than the negative power to disregard an
unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way of
the enforcement of a legal right."'147 The 1946 plurality opinion in
Colegrove v. Green,4 8 in which the Court refused to entertain an action
142. See Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865).
143. UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 6.
144. BORCHARD 299; 6A J. MOORE, supra note 34, § 57.08 [4].
145. BORCHARD 85.
146. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943); cf. J.. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (relief should not be limited to declaration where injunction is also
available and appropriate).
147. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,488 (1923) (emphasis added).
148. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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to declare Illinois congressional districts invalid, expressed the same
thought: "Of course no court can affirmatively remap the Illinois
districts so as to bring them more in conformity with the standards of
fairness for a representative system. At best we could only declare the
existing electoral system invalid."'' Justice Black, dissenting, accepted
this premise, but thought the Court should exercise its negative power to
invalidate the existing districts, leaving congressmen to be elected at
large unless the legislature saw fit to redistrict. 150
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Colegrove point to the
line separating justiciable from nonjusticiable issues in constitutional
cases. If a trial court exercises its "negative" power either by denying
the plaintiff relief, or by granting him relief through a refusal to enforce
the challenged statute as applied to the particular plaintiff in the specific
situation shown by the record, it is well within the judicial function. On
the other hand, when-as in the reapportionment and school
desegregation cases-the court not only denies effect to an
unconstitutional law, but also assumes the tasks of creating a valid law
and supervising its subsequent application, issues of finality are raised in
an acute form, and the court may well have intruded upon a domain
beyond its practical and constitutional competence.
In the reapportionment cases the Supreme Court, once embarked
on requiring district court supervision of redistricting, was driven by the
inexorable limits of judicial competence to simplify the issue to "one
man, one vote" in all situations, regardless of interference with a
coordinate branch of the government, 15' the amount of litigation
provoked, 52 competing considerations, 153 and the will of a majority of
the people involved.'1 The Court has felt compelled to give orders to a
state legislature regarding the bills it might pass'55 and to strike down
variations of less than four percent because the legislative solution
149. Id. at 553.
150. Id. at 574.
151. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
152. For example, in an unusual series of cases, the Court invalidated 3 successive attempts to
reapportion the Florida Legislature. Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 383
U.S. 210 (1966); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967). See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965)
(validating apportionment of Georgia Legislature "on its face" but expressly reserving questions of
validity in actual operation). For data on the volume of reapportionment litigation see Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 382 (1963).
153. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
154. Jordan v. Silver, 381 U.S. 415 (1965); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S.
533 (1964). In each case a majority of the state's voters had approved the districting.
155. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Parsons v. Buckley, 379 U.S. 359 (1965).
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departed from "the mathematical ideal."' The Court, moreover, has
pressed on to apply the "one man, one vote" rule to almost every type of
minor political district in the country, 57 despite the protests of Justice
Harlan that "these adventures of the Court in the realm of political
science are beyond its constitutional powers."'11
8
In the school desegregation cases, the results are even more
troublesome because the Court has not adopted a simple legal rule
comparable to "one man, one vote." The resulting unavoidable
excursions into local politics have led to strong criticism of the Court by
its brethren on the state supreme courts, 59 proposals in Congress
reminiscent of the Roosevelt "court-packing plan,"'" and expressions of
despair by the lower federal courts charged with the implementation of
the Court's policies. Judge Wisdom of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, after recounting the twelve-year effort towards desegregation of
schools, said: "The courts acting alone have failed."'' The reasons for
that failure were well summarized in another opinion from the same
Circuit, in which the court spoke of "great anxiety. . . with the Brown
approach," and concluded:
[Judicial desegregation] inescapably puts the Federal Judge in the middle of school
administrative problems for which he was not equipped and tended to dilute local
responsibility for the highly local governmental function of running a community's
schools under law and in keeping with the Constitution."12
In both cases the court relied on the standards adopted by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, rather than on its own
judgment, in attempting to solve these "administrative problems."
Unable to develop judicially a simple legal rule in the school cases,
the Supreme Court has pushed the lower courts ever further into the
details of school administration. No longer is a district court allowed to
say: "The Constitution . ..does not require integration. It merely
forbids discrimination."'' r 3 During the 1967 and 1968 terms, for
156. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); accord, Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542
(1969).
157. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474 (1968); Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
Justice Fortas, dissenting in Avery, referred to 81,253 local governments in the United States. 390
U.S. at 499.
158. 390 U.S. at 487.
159. Report of the Committee on Federal-State Relationships as Affected by Judicial
Decisions, submitted to the Conference of Chief Justices, Aug. 20, 1958.
160. S. 1392, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
161. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966).
162. Price v. Denison Ind. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1965).
163. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776,777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
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example, the Court affirmed a district court order fixing mathematical
ratios of black and white teachers, 1" and instructed a school board that
its duty was not merely to remove segregation but "to effectuate a
transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system."' The last
cited case is particularly instructive concerning the Court's recent
methodology. The Court struck down a "freedom-of-choice" plan
because in its three years of operation not a single white child attended
the former black school, and the former white school was still 85 percent
white; these facts, said the Court, showed that "the school system
remains a dual system."' That it remained a dual system in policy is of
course a complete nonsequitur from the facts stated. In the absence of
evidence, one can only speculate about the cause, but it is at least equally
probable that the continued segregation was due to the actions of parents
rather than to the policy of the school board. That it remained a dual
system in fact is at least partially true, according to the record, but if the
Court now intends to fix mathematical ratios for black and white
teachers and pupils in every public school in the land, it may be entering
a contest not only with school authorities but with the parents of school
children as well. As long as American citizens have the freedom to decide
where they shall live, and the desire to get for their children what they
think is the best possible education, such a contest between the Court
and the citizenry can have but one outcome.
To say that the Court will lose a political contest in which it is
arrayed against both the local governments and the citizens is not to say
that its objectives are unworthy or that other branches of the government
cannot achieve those objectives by other means. The Civil Rights Act of
1964 authorizes technical and financial assistance in the desegregation of
local schools and the training of teachers and other personnel,1 7 and
delegates to the Commissioner of Education the administrative power to
deny financial aid to school systems that fail to comply with regulations
requiring desegregation. 68 This legislation was described by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as not only appropriate and constitutional,
but also necessary to rescue school desegregation from the bog in which
it had been trapped for the previous ten years while the federal courts
164. United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
165. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). It is not clear whether a
"racially non-discriminatory school system" is the same as a "unitary school system within which
no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or color," as prescribed by
the decree in the later case of Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
166. 391U.S. at441.
167. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2 to -4 (1964).
168. Id. §§ 2000d,-!,-5.
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sought unaided to enforce compliance. 1"9 The 1964 Act authorizes the
courts to grant or deny enforcement of administrative orders, including
orders denying financial aid. 170 Thus, the way is open for the courts to
return to the statutory and constitutional controversies with which they
are equipped to deal, if the Supreme Court will permit them to do so.'7
As this is written, the Supreme Court has before it cases that will
allow it to permit lower courts to withdraw to more tenable positions in
the field of school desegregation. 72 It is hoped that the Court will
embrace these opportunities. The alternative is to continue on the present
course until the detailed administrative decrees that the trial courts must
enter become wholly unenforceable, through sheer inability of the court
machinery to cope with the problems involved. In that direction lies
increasing disrespect for the courts and grave danger for the rule of law.
Unfortunately, some recent decisions of the Court in other fields
evidence a determination to enter judgments, whether or not they are
enforceable, by claiming the power to declare in the absence of any
present or future power to coerce. 73 The most significant of these cases is
Powell v. McCormack,74 in which the Court, speaking through the
former Chief Justice on the eve of his retirement, held that Congressman
Powell's prayer for a declaration establishing his right to a seat in
Congress presented a justiciable controversy, while specifically refusing
to decide whether the declaration could ever be enforced by a coercive
judgment. The Court directed that defendant members of the House be
dismissed, and declared Powell's right to his seat only against the
House's clerk, sergeant-at-arms, and doorkeeper. The finding of
justiciability was not supported by the earlier cases cited in the opinion,
in which both declaratory and injunctive relief could have been
granted. 75 Furthermore, while the case was pending, the term for which
169. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 856 (5th Cir. 1966).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1964).
171. E.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (the Court not only ordered the
county to cease supporting private schools, but also ordered it to reopen the public schools; the
second part of the order could now be left to administrative enforcement).
172. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D.N.C.),
306 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (supplementary opinion and order), 311 F. Supp. 265
(W.D.N.C.) (setting deadlines for complete integration), joined and cert. granted, 397 U.S. 978
(1970).
173. Mitchell v. Donovan, 397 U.S. 982 (1970); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 499
(1969); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967).
174. 395 U.S. 486 (1970), revg as tojurisdictional issues 395 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968), affg
266 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1967) (complaint dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter).
175. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (declaration settling conflicting claims
of the parties to oil and gas underlying submerged coastal lands; no injunction prayed); United Pub.
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Powell was excluded expired, and he was re-elected and seated, thus
rendering even the declaration moot;'76 however, a motion to dismiss on
this ground was denied. If the Court had been faced with the prospect of
enforcing its declaration, it would have been unable to do so because the
remaining defendants were merely subordinate employees of a
coordinate branch of the government carrying out a positive order of
their employer, and subject to its contempt powers. A Court order would
have compelled them to choose between obeying the House majority and
obeying the Court. The Court majority chose to avoid this danger by
rendering an advisory opinion in a case that had ceased to be a
controversy against defendants who had no real interest in the case and
no power to act.
A declaration that will never be enforced is an exercise in judicial
irresponsibility and a perversion of the Declaratory Judgment Act and
other sections of the Judicial Code.1 77 It is especially mischievous in
constitutional cases such as Powell and should be vigorously
disapproved. 17  Hope for this result is nurtured by the strong dissent of
the new Chief Justice in a case in which the majority imposed
constitutional limitations on termination of welfare benefits at the very
time that the government was in the process of developing administrative
safeguards that would render the judgment unnecessary. His trenchant
criticism of "the now familiar constitutionalizing syndrome" and the
Court's search for "instant solutions" presages a greater awareness of
the impact of Court decisions in the real world.
1 79
Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (Hatch Act found valid and Court therefore
did not decide whether allegations of injury would have supported an injunction against its
enforcement); cf. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (Court granted declaratory judgment and
injunction to restore a state senator to his position; it appears that the exclusion from office
continued up to date ofjudgment).
176. In Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U.S. 528 (1926), when a Philippine senator prayed
mandamus and injunction to restore his seat for a term which had expired prior to judgment, the
case was dismissed as moot, although the question of his salary for the expired term remained open.
In the Powell case, plaintiff's claim for salary was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims (see
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964)) and not within thejurisdiction ofthe district court where the suit was filed
(see id. § 1346).
177. Contra, Note, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute and Declaratory Judgments in
Constitutional Litigation, 83 HARV. L. Rev. 1870, 1878-79 (1970) (federal court may issue
declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1964), and then issue an injunction to enforce the declaration
under id. § 1651, without complying with the Three Judge Court Act, id. § 2282).
178. "Declaratory relief in this case is particularly inappropriate since it could not finally
terminate the controversy, indeed, it might well tend to resurrect the very conflict our holding of
inappropriateness seeks to avoid." Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
179. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 282 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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III. CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis is not designed to criticize the objectives
pursued by the Supreme Court since 1953. Many of these objectives were
clearly sound, and time might even vindicate the Court's doctrinaire
solution in the redistricting cases. The analysis has sought only to
demonstrate that even the achievement of legitimate objectives may be
jeopardized by careless craftsmanship and unconstitutional uses of
declaratory remedies. More specifically, it has endeavored to make clear
that in recent years the Court has too often used declarations of rights to
avoid the arduous task of comprehending the complexity of the
problems before it and the long-term consequences of attempting to
enforce the decisions that it directed the lower courts to enter.
This jeopardy to the federal courts and their functions appears to
have arisen from lack of attention to at least three inherent limitations
on the United States courts.
The first limitation is imposed by the restriction of the federal
judicial power to "cases" and "controversies" under Article III of the
Constitution. The significance of this limitation has never been better
expounded than by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison:
"The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion."' If "individuals" be
broadened to "litigants," Marshall's statement of the courts' province
remains as valid as when it was uttered. The great Chief Justice saw that
every advance by the federal courts into an area previously considered
nonjusticiable necessarily raises new enemies and imperils the support of
the executive, the Congress, and the people, which he knew is necessary
to the performance of the Supreme Court's function. Each such advance,
therefore, should be made with caution, in the clear exercise of the
Court's duty to decide the rights of litigants, and with the realization
that an unenforceable legal declaration is both unconstitutional and far
more dangerous to our people and our institutions than no declaration at
all.
The second limitation is inherent in the restricted means by which
federal courts can gather information. This limitation flows from the
first because the restriction of the federal judicial power to "cases" and
"controversies" means that a court is dependent on the record made by
parties having standing to invoke its aid in any particular case. Unlike
Congress and the administrative agencies, the federal courts have little
180. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
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power to summon expert assistance, or to employ staffs to investigate
both the background of the cases brought before them and the
consequences of possible judgments. Even if federal judges had the
power, they lack the time and the training to use such material
effectively. It is of great importance, therefore, that the courts' duties be
limited to "legal" materials, and that the evidentiary basis of a decision
be sufficiently developed and presented in the record so that, in
constitutional cases, the court can reach a sound conclusion on the facts
and foresee the legal significance of its judgment in terms of both res
judicata and precedent. Aids to the court from outside the record by
means of amici curiae and the "Brandeis brief" are excellent cautionary
devices to encourage humility, but are wholly inadequate as props to the
assertion of affirmative judicial control over new and unfamiliar social
forces.
The third limitation arises from the ultimate powerlessness of the
courts to effectuate their judgments. American history has seen cases in
which the United States Supreme Court has been openly and flagrantly
defied, and other cases in which knowledge that it might be defied caused
the Court to proceed with circumspection. Legislative proposals have
been made to limit the power of the Court, and in some cases the
proposals have been adopted. Fortunately, the limits on the
congressional power to deprive the Court of jurisdiction under Article
III of the Constitution have not been tested. In order to maintain its
authority in the face of such challenges, the Court must be able to
convincingly assert that it is doing only its duty to decide the rights of
litigants. If it attempts to do more over any extended period of time, it
risks grave misunderstandings and can correct itself only by open or
covert confession of error. Unlike the courts, Congress and the
administrative agencies can assemble large amounts of information,
openly change their minds on the basis of new information, and frankly
shape their actions in accordance with "public convenience and
necessity." The fact that the Court may for a time exceed the limitations
of its power, by drawing on the reservoir of respect and good will built
up by its predecessors, does not mean that the reservoir is inexhaustible.
The Court's legal authority ultimately rests on its moral authority,
which, once dissipated, cannot be easily restored.
In short, lasting constitutional adjudication, like politics, is always
"the art of the possible." Constant awareness of the laws of that art, and
their application through jurisdictional limitations, is the best security
for individual justice and permanent judicial accomplishment.
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Appendix
Following is a listing, by year of decision, of nonconstitutional declaratory cases,
and constitutional declaratory cases that are cumulative to those discussed or of limited
interest. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
1954: Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment,
347 U.S. 590 (declaratory judgment that apportioned ad valorem tax on plaintiff's
aircraft was valid); Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (state may not suspend
interstate carrier's right to use state highways as sanction for violation of state weight
law).
1955: Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 349 U.S. 254 (declaratory judgment
that plaintiff's employees were subject to Fair Labor Standards Act); Peters v. Hobby,
349 U.S. 331 (declaratory judgment that plaintiff's removal from federal employment
was unlawful, but reinstatement denied because his term had expired).
1956: International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537
(declaratory judgment on priority of liens); Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351
U.S. 40 (ICC order held subject to judicial review); United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 351 U.S. 192 (broadcasting Company has standing to challenge FCC order
amending licensing rule); Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253 (state
tax on real property leased from United States declared valid); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S.
536 (declaratory judgment that plaintiff's removal from federal employment was
unlawful, and reinstatement ordered); DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (illegitimate
child of deceased copyright owner declared entitled to share in renewal of copyright);
Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (alien declared entitled to judicial review of
exclusion order).
1957: Ceballos v. Shaughnessy, 352 U.S. 599 (alien's voluntary act in seeking
relief from military service declared to make him ineligible for citizenship); Rabang v.
Boyd, 353 U.S. 427 (Filipino's petition for habeas corpus and declaratory judgment to
halt deportation denied); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (declaratory judgment that
plaintiff's removal from federal employment was unlawful, and reinstatement ordered);
Wilson v. Girard 354 U.S. 524 (waiver by United States of jurisdiction over crime
committed by serviceman in Japan declared unconstitutional); Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (district court erroneously dismissed declaratory judgment action that union did
not fairly represent plaintiff Negro employees).
1958: Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (state statute
prohibiting carrier from transporting government property at unapproved rates declared
unconstitutional); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (nonhonorable discharge from
army for pre-induction acts declared invalid); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (preferential routing contracts with railroad's grantees declared violation of
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invalid); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 269 (District Court's temporary approval
of desegregation plan affirmed).
1970: Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (Georgia grand jury selection law declared
invalid on its face and as applied); Arkansas v. Tennessee, 396 U.S. 873 (state
boundaries declared); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 1054 (school
desegregation order affirmed); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728
(statute permitting notice to Post Master not to deliver pandering advertisements
declared valid); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (Arizona statutes limiting
vote on approval of revenue bonds to real property owners declared invalid, but decision
will apply only prospectively); Gunn v. University Comm. to End the War in Viet Nam,
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